What is chaos phenomenologically

Body and situation. To the theory and research program of neophenomenological sociology

The phenomenologically oriented sociology is predominantly in the tradition of the transcendental phenomenology Edmund Husserl and the oral phenomenology of Alfred Schütz ’. It therefore presents itself primarily as a sociology of the world of life, everyday life and knowledge. In contrast to this, the article outlines an alternative phenomenological sociology, the philosophical foundation of which is Hermann Schmitz's New Phenomenology. On this basis, above all Schmitz's body and situation theory, the basics of neophenomenological sociology (NPS) are presented. Its essential building blocks are (1) the bodily-affective being affected as a pre-personal a priori of the social, (2) bodily communication as a source of you evidence and the smallest analytical unit of the social, and (3) the common situation as a social ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality.

Phenomenologically oriented sociology stands predominantly in the tradition of the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the mundane phenomenology of Alfred Schütz. It therefore presents itself primarily as sociology of the lifeworld or everyday life, and as sociology of knowledge. In contrast, this article sketches an alternative phenomenological sociology, the philosophical foundation of which is the New Phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz. It is particularly the theory of the felt body (body) and the situation theory of Schmitz, which are presented as the basic elements of Neophenomenological Sociology (NPS). The article outlines especially three aspects of the theory and research program of the NPS: (1) The affective involvement as a pre-personal a priori of the social, (2) the felt-bodily (biological) Communication as the source of “Du-Evidenz” and as the smallest analytical unit of the social, as well as (3) the common situation as a social-ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality.

1 Introduction

Since the fundamental theoretical work of Alfred Schütz, phenomenology has been one of the most important philosophical disciplines within sociology. In addition to its fundamental importance for the so-called phenomenological sociology following Schütz, the influence of phenomenology is particularly evident in ethnomethodology, the sociology of knowledge and the methodology of qualitative social research, but also in Luhmann's systems theory, Habermas 'critical theory or Giddens' structuring theory found. It is noticeable that the sociological examination of phenomenological philosophy is limited to a narrow circle of authors and topics. Since the groundbreaking investigations by Schütz, the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl has been the undisputed point of reference for sociology (cf. Schütz 1960, 1971a, 1971b). Core themes of the phenomenological sociology inspired by Husserl are the consciousness-based constitution of meaningful action and the social, above all knowledge-based-communicative construction of social reality, the problem of understanding others and intersubjectivity as well as the issues of the world of life. In continuation of the Husserl-Schütz tradition, phenomenological sociology currently presents itself primarily as the life-world, everyday and knowledge sociology (see the overviews in Bühl 2002; Eberle 2012; Fischer 2012; Knoblauch 2009; Raab et al. 2008; for the Anglo-American region see Bird 2009; Ferguson 2006; Nasu 2012).

In addition to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenology of perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is likely to be the phenomenological philosophy most favored by sociology. Sociology draws on Merleau-Ponty in particular when the relationship between corporeality / sensuality and intersubjectivity / sociality is in question. The sociological interest here applies above all to Merleau-Ponty's concept of “inter-corporeality” (Merleau-Ponty 1994: 185), which is preferably used for a criticism of Schütz's egological approach and the development of a theory of sociality, the foundation of which is the functioning corporeality: the Body as a medium of action and as a mediator between the self and the world (see for example Bongaerts 2003; Coenen 1985a, 1985b; Crossley 1995, 1996; Fischer 2003; Meyer-Drawe 1984; Taylor 1986). Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty's body-phenomenological considerations find great resonance in the context of recent body sociology, above all in the discussions about a body-based, embodied sociology (for an overview, see Alkemeyer 2015; Gugutzer 2012, 2015a).

Compared with the central importance of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, those of Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levians, Ricoeur or Waldenfels as well as the currently particularly popular “enactive phenomenology” by Gallagher are sociologically marginal. Finally, the New Phenomenology by Hermann Schmitz (* 1928) is almost outside the field of perception of sociology. Schmitz's writings[1] are ignored by the majority of phenomenologically oriented sociologists.[2] One can only speculate about the reasons for the disinterest in Schmitz ’philosophy, but it is likely that an important role is played by the fact that the New Phenomenology has little in common with the old Phenomenology. Schmitz ’Phenomenology breaks with some of the basic assumptions of traditional phenomenology and devotes itself to marginalized or undiscovered topics. These include, in particular, the body as feeling around one's own body, bodily communication as a basic form of perception, subjectivity in the sense of subjective facts, feelings as spatially poured atmospheres, an anti-reductionist theory of space with the distinction between space and place - and directional space, situation as a basic ontological concept as well as half-things as phenomena between things and sensory data (see Schmitz 2016 for an overview). Given these thematic innovations alone, it is in fact justified by one New ones To speak phenomenology.

The similarities and differences between old and new phenomenology cannot be discussed in more detail at this point. With regard to the further argumentation, only two particularly important divergences should be emphasized: While Husserl's phenomenology is characterized by a "primacy of consciousness" (Suber 2007: 477) and a "triadic thing ontology" (Schmitz 2002: 15) and therefore a thinking in "constellation" (Schmitz 2003: 372), Schmitz's phenomenology is dominated by the primacy of “being affected by affection” or the body and represents a situation ontology (see Sections 2 and 4). The one following on from Schmitz’s phenomenology Neophenomenological Sociology (NPS),[3]The design of which we are talking about here shares their basic assumptions and therefore understands itself essentially as one body and situation based sociology.

So far, the NPS has been more of a program than a theoretically and methodologically comprehensive sociological approach. Apart from the work of Uzarewicz (2011) and Gugutzer (2012), there are no studies that have seriously attempted the development of a decidedly neo-phenomenological social or even social theory. Against the background of this desideratum, the primary aim of this article is to Theory and research program of the NPS to sketch in its essential features. This is intended to make it clear that beyond the dominant variety of phenomenological sociology, sensu Schütz und Nachsteiger, there is another, completely different, phenomenological sociology. For this purpose, the central concepts of the NPS are presented below: Body and feeling and the affective being affected as a prepersonal a priori of the social (2.), physical communication as the basic form of the social (3.) as well as the common situation - consisting of facts, programs and problems - as a social ontological foundation and empirical manifestation of sociality (4.). The conclusion summarizes the core elements of the NPS and their basic knowledge potential, names their knowledge limits and gives an outlook on the resulting elaboration of the draft presented here (5.).

2 Body and Feeling: Affective being affected as a prepersonal a priori of the social

The basic analytical reference point of the phenomenologically founded sociology based on Husserl is consciousness. Because reality constitutes itself in “activities of consciousness” (Luckmann 2008: 34), it is the task of sociology to reconstruct the “subjective realities of consciousness” (Hitzler 2005: 233) of people in order to work out how ever given historical realities are through human beings Action - also an achievement of consciousness (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 2003: 454) - can be constructed. The oral phenomenology is therefore the “subjective perspective” of the human actor - his experience, his experiences and his actions - “as last Point of reference for social science analyzes ”(Hitzler 2005: 236, Herv. In the original; see also Schütz 1971a: 50).

The NPS shares this view of oral phenomenology insofar as it also places subjectivity at the center of its analyzes. However, your concept of subjectivity is different. Subjectivity in the neo-phenomenological sense does not mean subjective consciousness, but "subjective facts (facts)”, And these are first and foremost the facts of“ being affective ”(Schmitz 1990: 6). A state of affairs is subjective, “if at most one, and only in his own name, he can testify ”(ibid., Herv. in orig.). I know with absolute certainty that I am in pain or hungry, that I am afraid of something or that I long for something, if or because of it affectively affected am Others, who experience me in my pain or hunger or know me so well that they know what I am afraid of or what I desire, can only talk about it in the sense of "objective" or "neutral" facts (ibid .: 5) . None of this will have the subjective meaning for them that it has for me, because these phenomena are only me really close because only I of them actually affected am Subjective facts are facts that leave no doubt that it is about oneself - in the sense of Horace's saying: "tua res agitur" (ibid .: 6). The facts of being affected by an affective state thus have a maximum evidence of subjectivity. Schmitz concludes from this that being affective is “the most important thing in people's life”, precisely because it shows “what people take important, for what and against what they warmly support” (Schmitz 2003: iii). Since his philosophy is essentially about the rehabilitation of the subjective, the affective being affected is "at the center of the new phenomenology" (ibid.).

The NPS follows this view and thus justifies its normative goal: Because the most important thing in life for people is phenomena of physical and affective being affected, the human sciences sociology has to dedicate itself to these phenomena. In addition, the decision for the primacy of bodily-affective being affected has the sociological advantage that the circle of socially relevant actors can be defined very broadly, at least further than is usual in sociology. Because, on the one hand, there has already been an affective concern pre-personal Level, namely with people who are not yet or no longer persons due to the lack of the ability to self-ascribe[4] are, for example, infants and dementia, possibly also comatose, on the other prehuman Level, i.e. in animals, at least in more highly developed animals. All of them are (potential) social actors in the sense of the NPS, which regards bodily-affective being affected as a priori of the social.

Of a A priori The social is here in the sense that the bodily-affective being affected is the condition of the possibility of sociality. Where no one can be affected, i.e. no bodies but only lifeless bodies are involved, sociality is not possible. Sociality presupposes corporeality. Corporeality is the a priori of Social specifically because being affective refers to something or someone else: A physical ego is affected by age (bemet, hegriffen), whereby age does not necessarily have to be a physical being and therefore not another person (see Section 3.3). Corporeality in the pathic sense of being affective is a relational category in which the own (body) is connected with the other (foreign, also non-human bodies, also immaterial). As will be said in section 3, the bodily communication that builds upon it is therefore the original unity of the social.

The NPS is by no means alone in assuming that corporeality is the a priori of the social. In her gender-sociological studies, Lindemann had shown early on that passive body experiences are essential for the stabilization of the gender order (cf. Lindemann 1992, 1993), which she generalized in her most recent socio-theoretical work to the effect that every social order is rooted in spatiotemporal physical environmental relationships that noticeably affect the self (cf. Lindemann 2014). Hartmut Rosa, on the other hand, speaks of the “presence of the world [..] fundamentally a pathic"(Rosa 2016: 188; Herv. In the orig.), While Waldenfels even speaks of the" birth of the social out of pathos "(Waldenfels 2015: 76) (on Rosa and Waldenfels cf. Gugutzer 2017b).

The focus of the NPS on the physical-affective being affected as a priori of the social does not correspond to a unique selling point. The NPS can, however, claim this aspect to be a central one action theory To be able to formulate the category. With Jürgen Hasse, this category can be described as “patheur”. By this, Hasse understands "the individual following vital and intuitive impulses in contrast to the rational and systematically acting 'actor". "(Hasse 2011: 70)[5] Translated from an action theory perspective, this means that the category Patheur represents an anti-rationalist, anti-leological understanding of action. It indicates that social action is, in many cases, physically directed and physically performed action beyond willful control. In this sense it can also be described as (stubborn) bodily action (see Gugutzer 2012: 53 ff .; see also section 4.2).

A social patheur is also characterized by the fact that his actions depend largely on those around him room and those that affect him thereby the atmosphere is motivated. “A patheur does not use a space like a car driver uses the road on the way to a desired destination. Rather, it empowers an “around real” expanded atmosphere to develop power over one's personal situation at this point in the room and to gain influence on one's actions ”(Hasse 2010: 70). The social patheur is integrated into a spatially extended, atmospherically charged situation, by which he is affected in a way that it has an impact on his actions and consequently on the situation. For the sociological theory of action it follows that with the focus on the social patheur 'automatically', the categories of space and atmosphere - which are virtually non-existent in theory of action - come into view.

Finally, or first and foremost, the predominant activist concept of action in sociological theory of action can be relativized with the category of the social patheur. Social action is not only a conscious-intentional acting, but an equally passively-suffered doing. The phenomenologically well-founded theory of action takes this into account on the one hand by differentiating between "suffering what is imposed and causing what is available" (Luckmann 1992: 28) . On the other hand, however, due to her reference to Husserl's philosophy of consciousness, she fails to concretise the action dimension “suffering” in a physical phenomenological way and to give passive-pathic bodily action a central place in her action theory. The NPS closes this action theory gap. By directing her gaze to the bodily experiences of life, she also focuses in particular on the surprising, unexpected, novel and thus social situations that cannot be controlled or only to a limited extent (see Section 4.1).

From what has been said so far follow research programmatic Consequences for the NPS. On the one hand, neophenomenological-sociological investigations are characterized by empirical Subject areas in which the physical-affective being affected is explicitly an issue. Whether it is typical love rituals in a couple relationship, cultures of disputes (refusal) in companies or the social consequences of collective protests by “angry citizens” - sociologically significant phenomena of bodily and affective being affected can be found on the micro, meso and macrosocial level. On the other hand is the theoretical The NPS always focuses on the action and interaction of social patrons. She directs her attention to the social relevance of passive-pathological bodily experiences, even or especially when it comes to topics that supposedly - because the sociological mainstream does not pay attention to them - have nothing to do with body and feeling. Actor and patheur are equally important to the NPS.

3 Physical communication: basic form of the (transhuman) social

The NPS starts with the bodily-affective being affected as the a priori of the social, but does not necessarily mean that it has reached the level of the social. Hunger, thirst, fear or pain affect the individual noticeably without the need for a second individual. The path from the individual to the trans-individual level leads through the physical communication (cf. Schmitz 1978: 75-109, 2011: 29-53), which, as mentioned above, is based on the relational character of the affective being affected. If the patheur is the central subject of the NPS, then bodily communication is its primordial concept of sociality.

The basis of the concept of physical communication is spatial-dynamic structure of the body (cf. Schmitz 2011: 7-27). Schmitz describes “narrow” and “wide” as its basal pair of opposites: The physical well-being always fluctuates “between the maximum possible tightness (mere primitive present) and the maximum possible width (pure, immeasurable width) in a thousand variations, without ever completely one of these Pole to reach. ”(Schmitz 1965: 75) The bodily dynamics of“ narrowing ”and“ widening ”form the vital drive of the human being. In the waking state, the person is physically always between these two poles, whereby, for example, in fright, fear or hunger the tightness predominates, while falling asleep, relaxed dozing or after an orgasm the widening. As long as the person is conscious, narrowing and widening are in a dynamic competitive relationship, which means that they 'work' against each other without breaking away from each other. If tightening (or “tension”) and widening (or “swelling”) compete “simultaneously” for supremacy, this can be felt as physical “intensity”, for example in the exertion of strength; if their conflict is “successive”, this results in a bodily “rhythm”, for example in lust. The dialogue between tightness and expanse is conveyed through the “bodily direction”, which leads irreversibly from tightness to expanse, exemplarily in the view or when breathing out (cf. ibid .: 75–126).[6]

This inner bodily dialogue between narrowing and widening becomes sociologically relevant because it becomes a trans-subjective bodilydialog can pass. This is the case when the bodily subject is affected by something or someone outside of itself to such an extent that it has to relate to it. Bodily communication in this general sense is “when someone is so affected and haunted by something in a way that is physically perceptible to him that he is more or less under its spell and is at least tempted to involuntarily conform to it and get away from it to let measure for his well-being and behavior in suffering and reaction. "(Schmitz 1978: 31 f.)

The quote indicates that there is bodily communication or "incorporation", the main type of bodily communication, by no means only between living beings, because a person can also fall under the spell of a feature film or a view of the sea. In cases like these it is a matter of "one-sided incorporation"; it is characteristic of all situations of fascination or suggestion by the non-human (music, images, spaces, landscapes, etc.). Since this is a literal one Relatedness of the fascinated person acts on something outside of himself, can already be at the level of one-sided incorporation of a social Relationship talk. At least if one takes the etymological meaning of the word “social” seriously, according to which “socius” means “common”, “communal”, “connected” (or “ally”, “companion”, “comrade”). The human being is also connected with the music, which gets into his limbs and seduces to dance to move.

“Mutual incorporation”, on the other hand, occurs when the interaction partners involved affect each other and this has an impact on their actions. If the type of physical communication is more of a contradiction to one another, Schmitz speaks of “antagonistic” mutual incorporation; if it is more of a togetherness, it is a matter of “solidarity” mutual incorporation.[7] An everyday and socially immensely significant example of antagonistic incorporation is eye contact, which Schmitz (1990: 136) also describes as a physically moving "wrestling match". "The exchange of glances is a power struggle fought out on physical terrain, irrespective of whether the participants want to lead it or not." (Gugutzer & Holterman 2017: 271) In contrast to this, the physical communication when singing in a choir or when rowing is in the "eighth "Significantly more solidarity: There is a" common vital drive "that connects the interaction partners with one another without them having to explicitly turn to one another; it is crucial that they have a common "integrating theme" with singing and rowing (Schmitz 2011: 47).

The aforementioned forms of incorporation (one-way / two-way, antagonistic / solidarity) have in common that they occur in a mediated way. Incorporation is made possible by media bodily communication, specifically through “close-to-body bridging qualities that can both be felt on the own body and perceived in the characters we meet.” (ibid .: 33) Described as the most important media or “bridges of bodily communication” (Schmitz 2005: 168–184) Schmitz on the one hand "suggestion of movement", such as the rhythm, on the other hand "synaesthetic characters", ie the "so-called intermodal qualities that cross-connect the various sensory areas (sight, hearing, touch, etc.)" (ibid .: 176). The air temperature can be warm or cold, as can a voice, soft or hard a pillow or a look, dark or light the night or a whistle, and all of this can have a massive impact on individual and social behavior.

3.1 Mutual incorporation as a source of the you-evidence

The concept of bodily communication is important for sociology because it provides an empirical basis for social relationships between humans and non-human entities. On the other hand, it has a theoretical relevance in that it helps to solve the intersubjectivity problem that is central to phenomenological sociology. This means the question how access to the other is possible, how Ego and alter enter into a social relationship and be able to recognize one another. As is well known, Schütz treated this question from the point of view of “understanding others” and answered it with the structural similarity of the consciousness processes in ego and age as well as with the “general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives” (cf. Schütz 1960: §§ 19-28). According to this, ego roughly understands the meaning of the action of alter because or to the extent that it interprets the signs and signs that age conveys as expressions of its consciousness. This pragmatic approach to the other, the core of which is the typification of motives for action, is sufficient for people's everyday actions. Schütz solved the problem of intersubjectivity transcendentally phenomenologically dealt with by Husserl after his turning away from Husserl (cf. Srubar 2007: 173–193) with oral phenomenology: intersubjectivity cannot be inferred from the transcendental subject because there is no direct path from one consciousness to the other, she but can be inferred from a lifeworld, which is why Schütz speaks of a “mundane intersubjectivity” (Schütz 1971c: 138).

But does this really answer the question of the constitution of intersubjectivity? As Nico Lüdtke (2008) rightly points out, not really. With his “general thesis of the alter ego” Schütz presupposes the existence of other people in the realm of the world as a given, which means that the “question of how ego and age can recognize each other as social beings and create a permanent intersubjective bond on this basis” no longer arises represents (ibid .: 192). With the concept of mundane intersubjectivity, on the one hand, it is not clear what the prerequisites for the sociality of ego and age are; on the other hand, it implies that social beings are exclusively human. Lüdtke concludes, somewhat resignedly, that the "problem of intersubjectivity [..] in phenomenology is still unsolved" (ibid .: 193) or "awaits its solution" (ibid .: 195).

However, this assessment does not apply to the New Phenomenology. From a neo-phenomenological perspective, Husserl’s as well as Schütz’s attempt to solve the intersubjectivity problem suffers from the fact that both do not know the pathic, perceptible body,[8] but only the (body) body on the one hand, spirit or soul or consciousness on the other. In Schmitz's understanding, they are thus in the prevailing tradition of the “psychologistic-reductionistic-introjectionistic way of thinking” of European intellectual culture (Schmitz 2003: 133), which leaves the question open of “how people get to each other and things” (ibid .) Husserl and Schütz use the word body, but mean the living body or the functioning (active) body, but not the body in the sense of being affected emotionally, of feeling oneself. Ego and alter are conceived by them as two firmly delimited, closed bodies with an inner world that is inaccessible from the outside, the seat of consciousness, and the only way to bridge the gap between oneself and the other is for ego and alter through interpretation the perceptible signs of the other (for Schütz see Coenen 1985b: 201 ff., for Husserl see Schmitz 2003: 146 f.).

From the perspective of the New Phenomenology, however, the intersubjectivity problem is resolved in the medium of bodily communication: the bridge between ego and age is mutual incorporation. Or as Schmitz says: "Mutual incorporation […] is the Source of the you evidenceto have to do with a conscious as a partner, be he a different person or an animal. ”(Schmitz 2003: 39 f .; Herv .: RG; see also ibid .: 151 and 2011: 42 f.) Basis for this is the affective involvement of ego by age (and vice versa). Sartre had already pointed this out in his analysis of the "gaze", in which he stated that being struck by the gaze of the other, that as subjective Bebeing drunk by this is sufficient as evidence of the existence of the other (cf. Sartre 1993: 299–397). Schmitz describes Sartre's “theory of being affected” as the first theory that worked out being affected by affection as the basis of “original partner finding” (Schmitz 1980b: 88). However, Sartre overlooked the reciprocity of the gaze and pretended, for example, that the shame felt by being looked at at the other was enough to already be 'with' the other subject. For the original finding of a partner - formulated sociologically: the constitution of intersubjectivity - however mutual Incorporation constitutive: One feels yourself touched by the other, feeling their gaze on your own body, as you do on the Others perceives bodily impulses or other expressions immediately noticeable - i.e. without conscious interpretation of signs - because these are conveyed directly via movement suggestions (e.g. gestures) or synaesthetic characters (e.g. soft voice) (cf. ibid .: 90 f.).

The gaze is of course not the only form of bodily communication in which intersubjectivity is constituted, nevertheless it is an excellent example of how a mutual relationship can get by without projections, apperceptions, analogy shots or empathy with the other. In eye contact, ego and age have the "involuntary certainty that they are dealing with another conscious person." (Schmitz 2011: 41) Georg Simmel accentuates this assumption sociologically when he says that the eye or the gaze is "the most immediate." and the purest interrelationship that actually exists. ”(Simmel 1992: 723) The gaze can therefore also be understood as an“ original source of sociality ”(Gugutzer & Holterman 2017: 268), waxillary incorporation accordingly as Basic form of the social.

In summary, this means: The intersubjectivity problem is clarified from the perspective of the New Phenomenology in an expansion and 'deepening' of the relationship between ego and age. While the egological perspective is directed from the consciousness of the egos to that of age (E → A) and thus fails, the neo-phenomenological perspective focuses on the egos of corporeality (E ← A) and stressed by age at the same time Corporeality claimed by the ego in old age (E → A). Because the bodily-affective being affected is the a priori of the social, the bodily communication of the type of mutual incorporation that builds on it is the sufficient criterion for the evidence that there are others for me and me for others (E ↔ A). The solution to the intersubjectivity problem For the NPS, this is not mundane intersubjectivity, but bodily intersubjectivity.

3.2 Transhuman sociology